Protectionist China

Reuters provides a handy rundown of China’s restrictions on US imports. They are… significant:


China keeps close control over the use of tech within its borders, including full or partial blocks against many popular U.S. firms including Google, Facebook Inc, Twitter Inc and others.

The Chinese government has adopted a raft of strict new cybersecurity regulations, which foreign business groups complain either put China off limits or require them to provide sensitive intellectual property for government checks. […]


Global carmakers can only operate in China, the world’s largest auto market, via joint ventures (JVs) with local partners, with their stake limited to 50 percent, part of a government drive to protect home-grown auto firms.

Tesla Inc chief executive Elon Musk said on Twitter earlier this month that China trade barriers created an unfair playing field and that it was “like competing in an Olympic race wearing lead shoes.” […]

China also imposes a 25 percent duty on imported vehicles, versus a 2.5 percent import tax in the United States.


Foreign financial firms face long-standing equity caps to participate in some services in China, including a 50 percent limit on life insurance and a 49 percent cap on foreign-invested securities broker-dealers. […]


China has a strict quota system for imported movies, limiting the number allowed to be shown on domestic cinema screens through the scheme to 34 each year. Hollywood producers also get around 25 percent of the box office, compared to nearer 40 percent they received in other overseas markets.


China bans imports of poultry, poultry products and eggs due to avian flu. It conditionally lifted an import ban on U.S. boneless beef and beef on the bone in June last year. […]


China requires rail equipment suppliers to its domestic train networks, which are among the world’s longest, to prove that at least 70 percent of their supply chain is in China.

Embracing “free trade” when your trading partners are severely protectionist is a bit like leaving all your doors unlocked when your neighbors are thieves.

Tariff talking points

Some thoughts from trade expert Alan Tonelson on the impending metals tariffs:

>Many countries have declared their intention to retaliate against the American tariffs with higher barriers to U.S. exports. Curiously, they are overlooking the Chinese government-subsidized overcapacity at the root of the long-time distortions in world steel and aluminum markets.

>Many of these countries want the problem tackled multilaterally. But the World Trade Organization (WTO) has failed to stem this overcapacity (or deal effectively with many other forms of Chinese trade and broader economic predation), and a G20 forum specifically addressing the steel issue has produced nothing since its founding in December, 2016.

>Although major steel-producing powers like the European Union have imposed their own steep tariffs on shipments from China, the global glut has continued. One reason may be that, since the global economic recovery took hold in 2010, according to World Steel Association data. the United States has been the major steel producer that has suffered by far the greatest loss of global production share by volume. (See this post of mine for the 2010 figures and the Steel Association’s latest report for the most recent – January, 2018 – figures.) And as of the most current World Steel Association data (2016), the United States is also the steel producer with the highest steel trade deficit by volume (21.7 million tons).

As a result, charges that American steel tariffs in particular will jeopardize the rules-based global trade system seem to be arguing that this system requires the United States to remain as the world’s dumping ground for government-subsidized steel.

Also don’t miss the follow-up post.

Who’s afraid of a trade war?

Can you be afraid of something that doesn’t exist?

Economist Ian Fletcher writes in the HuffPo:

Trade wars are mythical. They simply do not happen.

If you google “the trade war of,” you won’t find any historical examples. There was no Austro-Korean Trade War of 1638, Panamanian-Brazilian Trade War of 1953 or any others. History is devoid of them.

Please don’t respond with that old canard about the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 starting a trade war and causing the Great Depression. It doesn’t stand up, as actual economic historians from Milton Friedman on the right to Paul Krugman on the left have documented. See here, and here, and here.

The Depression’s cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. A wave of bank failures in 1930 spread the collapse around the country. Trade had nothing to do with it.

As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect. For a start, it only applied to about one-third of America’s trade: about 1.3 percent of GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent—not a large jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide absent tariff increases.

Now, there will be much sound and fury about the decision by the US to slap tariffs on steel and aluminum imports (of 25% and 10%, respectively). China, which accounts for 2% of US steel imports, will mostly shrug:

But most analysts said the move was more of an irritant to China than anything serious at this stage.

A glut of steel from China has fueled global oversupply, but Lu Zhengwei, chief economist at Industrial Bank in Shanghai, said China had already been working to cut overcapacity in its steel industry.

Anti-dumping duties imposed by the Obama administration on China two years ago had also helped cut U.S. imports from China and protect a restructured U.S. steel industry based around mini-mills, experts said. Last year, China’s steel exports fell 30 percent […]

The uproar over trade in nineteenth century commodities is drowning out the far more important issue for the US, which is the destruction of the American edge in advanced manufacturing thanks to trade and technology transfers:

America produced every important invention in the digital age, from integrated circuits to semiconductor lasers, solar cells, flat panel displays, sensors and light-emitting diodes. Except for integrate[d] circuits, Asia now produces virtually all the world’s output of these building-blocks of the electronics industry, and China has a crash program underway to become the world’s major producer of semiconductors.

The steel tariff could be just an opening salvo, as the US prepares to take action on high-tech manufacturing. That’s when the sparks would really fly. On the other hand, there are no clear signs that this will actually happen, so we’ll just have to wait and see.

“Enron on steroids”

The collapse of Alibaba, when it happens, is going to be spectacular. From the accounting blog “Deep Throat”:

So here are the metrics we’ve been discussing since the IPO, as described in the 12/31/17 materials/filings.

1.) Fake Revenue: Incredible 56% revenue growth last quarter. Most of this growth is likely just “fake” consolidation revenue masquerading as “organic” growth. (i.e. If Ebay bought Macy’s and consolidated same, Ebay’s revenue would jump 400% YOY in the consolidation quarter.) That’s probably what’s going on here (Intime, Cainiao, SunArt, Hema, Lazada, etc.). The “New Retail” model that management has been referring to (buying up brick and mortar) would have a much lower gross margin, and consequently, a much lower Price/Revenue ratio. Management has also, yet again, increased their “guidance”. It’s presumably much easier to forecast growth when you can go out and “buy” it. Unfortunately, since Revenue is, and has always been, reported as one big “Blob” we have no idea what it’s comprised of. (i.e. “Organic” e-Commerce vs. “Purchased” Brick & Mortar Revenue)

2.) “Questionable Assets”: (Investment Securities, Goodwill, Intangibles, Land Use Rights and Investments in “Investees”) are now a whopping US$56 Billion (51% of the balance sheet), up $9 Billion from $47 Billion in the prior quarter…..compared to roughly US$0.00 (0.00%) prior to the IPO just four short years ago. Alibaba Management continues to create financial vapor at an unprecedented pace.

3.) “Questionable Assets” – Valuation: I’ve long opined that IFRS accounting rules had required Alibaba Management to write down their interest in Alibaba Pictures and Alibaba Health by roughly $3.5 Billion because the publicly traded value simply didn’t support their carrying value. (See: Finding Inner Peace in Dharamsala …..and thoughts on the Alibaba 20-F…. ) Good news! ….this quarter they’ve finally written off $2.8 Billion on Alibaba Pictures!. We’re making progress!……Oh….but wait….when they consolidated the money-losing-dog-turd Cainaio “junk delivery by tuk-tuks & scooters ecosystem” business, they somehow reported a $3.45 Billion gain on the consolidation….more than fully offsetting the Alibaba Pictures write-down!

Etc, etc, etc. From a comment cited in the blog post:

I read your analysis on BABA and on so many different levels this screams “Enron 2.0”. The similarities are uncanny. But it’s actually worse than that. It’s Enron on steroids due to the fact that the Chinese government and regulatory bodies are likely aware of, and support the companies shenanigans, both implicitly and explicitly. If BABA is able to fleece American investors for billions of dollars in exchange for what will ultimately be worthless (or near worthless) equity, all the better. The average analyst/fund manager on Wall St. is likely too young to remember Enron as it happened in real time; even fewer of the older professionals who do remember could explain in depth how the company manufactured their financials and the machinations involved. Once again, history seems doomed to rhyme, if not repeat.


Asia’s financial hub is dominated by a handful of hoary plutocrats:

Many of Hong Kong’s richest families are preparing for a generational changing of the guard. Unfortunately for the UK colony turned Chinese “special administrative region”, the sons and daughters who will inherit Hong Kong’s biggest fortunes will continue to dominate an economy defined by rent-seeking monopolies. […]

As the old saying has it, the hardest million dollars you will ever earn is your first million. Hong Kong’s next generation of tycoons never had to earn their first million, let alone their first billion. The city’s property, ports, electricity and supermarket sectors, to name just a few, have been locked up by just eight families.

Hong Kong’s monopoly madness extends far down the economic food chain to its licensing systems for taxis and public minibuses. The number of taxi licences has not increased since 1994, while those for minibuses has been frozen since 1976.

Or, as a remarkable Time Out Hong Kong article from 2012 that was apparently spiked and later reinstated put it:

Here is your typical day in Hong Kong: after buying your groceries from Li Ka-shing, you hop on to one of Cheng Yu-tung’s buses to take you back to your Kwok brothers’ apartment to cook your food with, you guessed it, gas supplied by Lee Shau-kee. […]

Hong Kong was originally founded to serve the interests of business, not of its population. Government ownership of land was aimed at keeping taxes low. The tycoons did not devise this system; they have simply milked it (with a vengeance) while the government has done little to counterbalance their growing domination or address the broader impact on the economy and society. Since the 1997 handover, the government has been noticeably more proactive in serving the tycoons’ interests.

Seems legit

An insurance agent who has been ringing alarm bells about Alibaba at his blog provides a handy roundup of salient concerns about the NYSE-listed company:

The first step in any twelve (12) step process is to admit you have a problem. Yes America, we’ve been snookered. We’ve been hosed, screwed, ripped-off, etc. once again […]

If you doubt my thesis, ask yourself the following, relatively long, drawn out, rambling “if/then” question below:

If you think my thesis is wrong, and you really, truly believe that:

  • The roughly US$8 Trillion, of rapidly expanding Caymans money, much of it Chinese, is really used for charitable, philanthropic purposes (To my knowledge Mother Theresa didn’t have any Cayman accounts), and:
  • Alibaba is a historic model of “asset lite”capital efficiency creating $87 Billion in incredible balance sheet value, most of which are “intangible” assets, in just four short years, and:
  • All of the “Jumbo Jet”, “Yacht”, “Industrial Goods”, “Loans”, “Knock-Offs” and “Busted Real-Estate” listings are legitimate “Fast Moving Consumer Goods”, and:
  • Alibaba’s “Singles Day” $25 Billion GMV (the equivalent “work” of 51 million people in one day….140,000 Sears/Kmart Employees x 365 days) is accurate/real, and:
  • Chinese Bankers have lost their competitive fire and are willing to let this golden goose procure financing exclusively off-shore, and:
  • The “On Shore CNY”/”Off Shore CNH” dual currency system, where the “Off Shore” supply is controlled as tight as a drum to create the illusion of real trade value, while the “On-Shore” supply is printed faster than the Deutsche Mark in the post WWI Wiemar Republic, is just a quirky, non-purposeful aberration of Chinese Monetary Policy, and:
  • Alibaba continually shows up on the doorstep of US Investment Banks begging for US$ when 90% of their business is transacted in RMB, and:
  • The Bookrunners (JP Morgan, Citi, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, et. al.) of the brand spanking new US$7 Billion plus Junk Bond issue (mis-priced at only 120 bpts. over US Treasuries) are selling 40 year “BABA Bonds” as an altruistic, joint, “hands across the water” gesture, without regard to compensation and fees, and:
  • The 600+ related, consolidated, entities scattered all over the planet, have nothing to do with money-laundering and are indeed the most efficient way to run this enterprise, creating millions of as yet undefined future jobs in America, and:
  • The “franchise” office of PWC Hong Kong can effectively audit and verify the financial statements of these 600+ related, consolidated entities, with a few dozen staff, for approximately the same fee that PWC US would charge to audit a large domestic, auto dealership, and:
  • Jack, Joe, Daniel and Maggie are somehow untouchable, cutting edge entrepreneurs, operating as rebellious, disruptors to the appall and chagrin of the helpless, powerless, Chinese Communist Party, and:
  • By management’s own account, Alibaba is the most profitable business in history, beyond anyone’s wildest imagination, and:
  • You believe that American Financial and Political Leadership is both smart enough and honest enough (i.e. ..they patriotically push the huge checks back across the table) to prevent any “systemic financial contagion that nobody could possibly anticipate” from ever again happening… it has been happening roughly every decade since I was a little boy.

Then, if all of that makes perfect sense to you, you’re telling me there’s a chance:

  • That the Chinese government […] would ever, ever, ever in a million years, want to give up HALF (80% if you count Softbank) of Alibaba, this crown jewel, the secret sauce, the cornerstone of their new Internet economy, to a bunch of ignorant American and non-Chinese Investors? Huh?….Really?…

Huh, indeed. Just the fact that Alibaba refuses to provide a breakdown (by product category, region, etc.) of the total GMV (gross merchandise volume) figures it announces with such fanfare, should suffice to raise some serious questions about what is going on behind the curtain.

Here are some bonus thoughts on Japan’s SoftBank (a major investor in Alibaba), whose boss Masayoshi Son is quite a “character,” having at one point threatened to set himself on fire during a regulatory meeting.

A controversy

Remember that time a Chinese investment proposal toppled a Western government? Neither do I.

It really happened though — in 2013:

Talks to bring in Chinese capital to a large iron ore project weren’t even ripe for a deal when the outcry over a law facilitating the use of foreign labour led to fresh elections and a new cabinet that promises to revise that legislation.

Introduced by then PM Kuupik Kleist’s Siumut party and passed last December by the Greenlandic parliament, the so-called ‘large scale law’ (storskalalov) allows for foreign workers to be paid less than the local minimum wage of $14 per hour during the construction phase of large scale projects. Greenland’s untapped mineral resources, proponents argued, could help the country achieve economic self-sufficiency and eventually independence from Denmark, but cannot be developed without a workforce not to be found among the 58 thousand local inhabitants.

A large-scale fiasco

The law raised opposition both at home and in Denmark. Kleist’s government was accused of laying the ground for an invasion of thousands of Chinese workers that would amount to “social dumping”. Such large mining projects, some argued, would bring less benefits to the local population than traditional industries like fishing, which now accounts for 90% of the country’s exports. MP Nikku Olsen called the government’s policy towards foreign investment “very shallow and not thought through”, and led a breakaway faction of the ruling Inuit Ataqatigiit party to call for a referendum on the law. This triggered fresh elections that brought back to power the social democrats from Siumut, the dominant party since the first parlamentary elections in 1979, in a coalition with Olsen’s Parti Inuit and the centre-right Atassut. New PM Aleqa Hammond’s cabinet has stressed support for developing mining into the country’s main industry, vowing at the same time to revise the ‘large-scale law’ before next year.

Greenland (population 56,186) increasingly seems like a place to watch.

Paying for all that belt and road

Is China tying its financial stability to stuff like this?

An important article by economist Christopher Balding from back in May discusses the problems with China paying for its wildly ambitious (over-hyped?) One Belt, One Road infrastructure project:

Such doubts might seem spurious, given the numbers being tossed around. China claims nearly $900 billion worth of deals are already underway, with estimates of future spending ranging from $4 trillion to $8 trillion, depending on which Chinese government agency is doing the talking. At the conference itself, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged another $78 billion for the effort, which envisions building infrastructure to link China to Europe through Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

From no other country in the world would such pledges be remotely plausible. Yet even for China, they’ll be difficult to fulfill without clashing with the country’s other objectives.

Comrade Balding, as he styles himself, crunches the number in a bit more detail on his blog:

  1. Let’s use the $5 trillion over 5 years number reported by Nataxis (which I would highly recommend reading their research report on financing OBOR which is a link in the BV piece) but also note that other outlets like The Economist have reported similar numbers (theirs was $4 trillion). Use simple numbers for our purposes and assume it is all equally divided into equal blocks so every year sees $800b-$1t per year in overseas lending by China. That is an enormous, enormous, enormous jump in overseas lending. For thought experiment purposes, we have even extend this to 10 years. To put this in perspective, ODI from China to the ROW in 2016 after an enormous surge was $170 billion. Then ODI is down 49% YTD from 2016.
  2. Assume that all OBOR lending is done in USD, this means that either a) China is going to tap PBOC USD or b) they are going to do tap the USD bond market to fund these lendings. If China taps PBOC FX reserves to pay for this, with the numbers reported, they will have no USD left in the reserves. None. Zero. Zilch. In fact, not only will they have nothing left, they will have to begin borrowing on international USD to fund investments in such credit worthy places as Uzbekistan. For simplicity sake, assume they plan to invest $5 trillion, they use up all $3t in PBOC FX reserves and then they have to go borrow $2t on international markets. Frankly, this is a crazy financial risk by China.
  3. However, it isn’t fundamentally any better if China opts for option B to raise all the funding on international USD bond markets. If China raises the entire amount, as Nataxis noted, this raises Chinese external debt levels by about 40% of GDP and more importantly makes China exceedingly risky to any type of devaluation. Even small devaluations of the RMB would then become important. All of a sudden China becomes a very risky borrower with high levels of external debt and an increasingly risky tie to the USD. What is so crazy about this situation is that China has tied itself and its stability to the USD to Pakistani bridge repayment. Stop and wrap your mind around that for one second.

More at the link.

Balding’s conclusion in the Bloomberg article seems exactly right: “But it’s almost certain that the amount of money that makes its way into Belt-and-Road projects will be significantly lower than advertised. Grand in ambition but short on details, Xi’s sweeping initiative may be better thought of as a “philosophy” or “party line,” rather than a fixed commitment.”

China will almost certainly spend/loan a LOT of money to build the B&R, but it won’t be $5 trillion over five years (I mean, seriously). But over the long term, it will still be a lot.

Notably, the B&R doesn’t have a timeframe, which could mean either that the project is more of a marketing gimmick than a reality — or that China is simply in this for the long haul:

The only internal instructions that have come so far, have been from Zhongnanhai [China’s top leadership], and are about banning words like “project” (because the word connotes a goal and timeline, Beijing prefers the looser term “initiative”) as well as banning the publication of official maps purporting to show the scope of OBOR [One Belt, One Road].

Billionaires in one country

Lots of new billionaires are cropping up in China – with a catch:

The Chinese mainland added an average of two new billionaires to its super-rich list every week last year, according to new report, helping Asia replace the U.S. as the world’s most fertile cradle for individual wealth.

The report released Thursday by the investment firm UBS AG and consultancy PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) said 101 of the 162 Asians whose personal wealth passed the $1 billion threshold for the first time in 2016 were Chinese citizens.

China’s new billionaires helped boost Asian membership of the ultrawealthy club to 637 last year, compared to 563 in the U.S., according to the firms’ annual Billionaires Insight Report. It marked the first time that Asia could be called home to more billionaires than the U.S.

The report covered 1,542 billionaires residing in 14 markets worldwide. They account for about 80% of all individual wealth held by the world’s super-rich.

The catch is pointed out by economist Christopher Balding:

Comrade Balding‏
This omits one key issue: if you are a billionaire in China, you are only a billionaire in China. You are not a global billionaire

Woke Charles Bingley‏
why is that?

Comrade Balding‏
Officially, you are allowed to move $50k per year out of China. Unofficially you can move a little more but definitely not enough

Woke Charles Bingley‏
Wow I did not know that!

Comrade Balding‏
If you really wanted to you could find ways to move more than that but no where near tens or hundreds of millions

Some seem to be able to buy English Football Clubs and American film studios though.

Comrade Balding‏
Those deals haven’t happened for a while

They have tightened up a lot recently. It’s like Greece & Russia the smart or connected ones have already got their money out

Comrade Balding‏
assets are still on the Mainland. Just because its owned by a Cayman holding corp doesn’t mean the asset is out of the country

Like Wolverhampton Wanderers or Birmingham City or Aston Villa all owned by Chinese “businessmen”

Graham White‏
It’s only $50k of personal wealth. If you are a Chinese billionaire your company can buy overseas assets, eg London property, and sell on.

Comrade Balding‏
2017 has really cracked down on any movement and definitely not enough to move significant portion of wealth if desired

Robert Wishart 魏罗斌‏
Because you cannot move your money abroad?

Comrade Balding‏
Exactly. Not any material amount

“Captive billionaires” might be a better term for people who are billionaires within the borders of China, but millionaires everywhere else.