One of the two remaining imperial passports from an ambassador of Kublai Khan:
I’m not entirely clear on who this guy is, but he has a strong opinion on what would happen in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan:
Now let me tell you the biggest military fiction to be found on the planet.
Taiwan will be able to defend itself against a Chinese invasion. The US will rush to Taiwan’s aid in the event of an invasion. Finally the combined might of the US and Taiwan with MAYBE the assistance of others in the region will be able to retake the island in the event that the Chinese establish a foothold/successfully take it.
Sorry boys and girls. Ain’t happening.
No matter how you slice it, we are victims of time and distance. The Chinese are too close, we’re too far away and the Taiwanese have been so thoroughly infiltrated that success is impossible.
Look at the Chinese order of battle.
Do the same for Taiwan.
The results of your count should be obvious. Taiwan will fall.
Some numbers to consider:
China’s armed forces have long outnumbered and outspent Taiwan’s. China now has 800,000 active combat troops in its ground forces, compared with 130,000 in Taiwan; its budget last year was $144 billion, compared with Taiwan’s $10 billion, according to the Pentagon’s most recent annual report on the Chinese military. (Congress approved a $700 billion Pentagon budget in September, with an even larger increase than President Trump had requested.)
Back to the military blogger guy:
Remember the proposal (don’t know where it came from) to forward position US Marines on the island? If that was followed thu then the calculations change dramatically depending on the size of the force. Put a Platoon forward and its pretty much the same. Make it a Battalion and suddenly you have enough Marines in harm’s way where abandonment or rapid evacuation becomes impossible when ships show up on the horizon. Additionally you have the spectre of a Battalion of Marines “cutting and running” or being destroyed by Chinese forces. That would require a full scale military push if not to save the Taiwanese then to save the Marines.
That proposal would have signalled our determination for Taiwan to remain free.
But we didn’t bite.
Which means that this conversation has already occured at the highest levels of the Pentagon/State Dept/National Command Authority.
It has certainly been obvious for a while that when the pedal hits the metal, the US will throw Taiwan under the bus rather than fight China. As time goes on, China’s military edge over the self-governing island grows more extreme. It’s also very telling that Taiwan is struggling to recruit soldiers as it phases out conscription. The national morale needed to risk life and limb fighting off a PLA invasion seems… lacking.
There is some interesting back-and-forth about China’s capabilities in the blog’s comments section:
Danger_Maus • 3 days ago
You say Taiwan will vote to reunite with the mainland in a decade; that really shows your lack of understanding of the Taiwanese hatred of the communist regime of China. The only way the commies can “unite” the island with the mainland is by force.
Also I find your understanding of the local geography lacking as well. The Taiwan strait is 130 kms at its narrowest. The waters of the strait is considered the roughest in the northern hemisphere and the western side of the island (facing the mainland) has no beaches, only mud flats – the beaches are on the eastern side. This isn’t a Normandy crossing and the PLAN still hasn’t the capacity/capability to bring a significant number of troops ashore without them being sunk and drown at sea.
Solomon Mod Danger_Maus • 3 days ago
80 miles? hardly a long distance. i drive further than that on an almost daily basis. sorry bro but you’re dealing with an American. we know distance. we conquer just for shits and giggles in our personal lives much less militarily. 80 miles? that barely qualifies as a decent training opportunity much less a real world military mission…especially for forcible entry forces.
so what does that SHORT FUCKING DISTANCE mean? it means its within range of EVERY SINGE FIGHTER AND TRANSPORT PLANE IN THE CHINESE AIR FORCE! it means that an LCAC can cover the distance FROM FREAKING CHINA to Taiwan in 2 hours (assuming a transit speed of 35 knots)…it means that you have the almost IDEAL conditions for everything from a RAID to an AIR ASSAULT to a PARACHUTE ASSAULT to a MASSIVE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT using AERIAL INSERTION and SURFACE ASSAULT ASSETS!
you talk about me not knowing geography? hell yeah i know the geography. what i can’t figure is why China hasn’t already attacked. the ground is laid. this would be the stroke that would cement them as a Super Power with muscle to enforce their will.
no matter how you slice this thing. from a military point of view Taiwan is undefensible.
wtfunk555 • 4 days ago
Taiwan isn’t gone. If Taiwan were gone then the Trump administration would not be shoring up US Taiwan relations. Pence would not have recently singled out Taiwan as model of democracy in the Chinese speaking world. Trump wouldn’t be conducting all these FNOP operations right in China’s face if he didn’t believe the US could prevail over China. Losing Taiwan would signify to the world that Japan, The Philippines, Vietnam heck most of the Pacific is up for grabs thus the US isn’t just going to hand Taiwan over to China on a silver platter. If anything, the US seems be closer to Taiwan today, than it has been in decades.
Trump knows that China is the US’s biggest threat. He’s already taken steps to neutralize China starting with its economy. I’d even go so far as to say that USMCA was written in a way to specifically counter China’s exploitation of NAFTA loopholes to access America’s market.
Solomon Mod wtfunk555 • 4 days ago
wait. are you being serious or are you just being a nationalist (Taiwan) on this issue? i’m just looking at things as they are not as i wish them to be. you point out that as goes Taiwan so goes the Pacific? i think you’re just not being honest there. Taiwan could fall and the rest of the Pacific would remain unchanged. the same talk happened with regard to Hong Kong. it fell underneath China’s orbit and everything else remained the same.
quite honestly Taiwan COULD BE SEEN JUSTIFIABLY SO (to some) as properly being Chinese territory. a breakaway Republic but Chinese territory none-the-less.
but my bigger issue is the defense of Taiwan. i just don’t see how it could realistically done. we’re certainly not going to launch a nuclear war in defense of Taiwan so how do we defend it? additionally the US and Russia and NATO have ALL STARTED CONDUCTING LARGE SCALE EXERCISES! we claim that Trident Junction is peaceful but given past tensions it could mask an invasion. the same occurred with the large scale Russian exercise. i heard talk from some that it was a mask to make a move into Western Europe (yeah crazy talk). i said all that to say that the “we can see it from a mile away” is just plain happy talk. China has too many forces in the area. they run too many snap drills. the only real alert we’ll have is when we see Chinese Paratroopers and Marines loading transports and then its all over but the crying.
explain that away before you slam me for my thoughts on the subject. how far away is Taiwan from the mainland? a shorter drive than Atlanta to Louisiana! MUCH SHORTER. in today’s military that’s incredibly short.
The first state visit by a Japanese leader to China in seven years suggest that the two countries, which allegedly have deep-seated mutual animosity, are in the process of strengthening ties:
What Happened: China and Japan signed multiple agreements intended to strengthen bilateral ties during the first day of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s official visit to China, the South China Morning Post reported Oct. 26. Both countries will cooperate on roughly 50 third-country infrastructure projects and agreed to resume currency swaps. Additionally, they will further discuss joint East China Sea energy cooperation and China’s lifting of food import restrictions following the nuclear disaster at Fukushima.
Why It Matters: Both China and Japan are recalibrating their strategies toward each other as they look to hedge against uncertainties as well as increasing trade protectionism from the United States.
This makes sense; as the neoliberal world order falls apart, regional trade blocs will emerge and solidify, and Japan and China, with their proximity and shared Confucian heritage, can be expected to align more closely.
Stratfor argues, however, that any Sino-Japanese rapprochement is complicated by China’s maritime ambitions, which clash with Japan’s interests as an island nation. Japan is also expanding its activities in the South China Sea, recently sending a submarine to conduct drills there for the first time. The duo may need to remain frenemies for a while.
It may seem that I am beating up on a certain country all the time, for unknown reasons of my own, but in fact I am just relaying the accelerating flurry of reports of official misbehavior by that country’s government and state-owned corporations. Now we learn that, allegedly, China Telecom – one of the big three state-owned telecom providers – has hacked North America’s internet infrastructure (PDF link):
China Telecom has ten strategically placed, Chinese controlled internet ‘points of presence’ (PoPs) across the internet backbone of North America. Vast rewards can be reaped from the hijacking, diverting, and then copying of information-rich traffic going into or crossing the United States and Canada – often unnoticed and then delivered with only small delays. […]
Over the past few years, researchers at BGProtect LTD based on the DIMES project [DIMES] at the Tel Aviv University built a route tracing system monitoring the BGP announcements and distinguishing patterns suggesting accidental or deliberate hijacking across many routes simultaneously and with a granularity down to the individual city. Using this technique, the two authors of this paper noticed unusual and systematic hijacking patterns associated with China Telecom. […]
Using these numerous PoPs, CT has already relatively seamlessly hijacked the domestic US and cross-US traffic and redirected it to China over days, weeks, and months as demonstrated in the examples below. The patterns of traffic revealed in traceroute research suggest repetitive IP hijack attacks committed by China Telecom. While one may argue such attacks can always be explained by ‘normal’ BGP behavior, these, in particular, suggest malicious intent, precisely because of their unusual transit characteristics – namely the lengthened routes and the abnormal durations. The following are a set of such unusual cases.
An article summarizes:
In 2016, China Telecom diverted traffic between Canada and Korean government networks to its PoP in Toronto. From there, traffic was forwarded to the China Telecom PoP on the US West Coast and sent to China, and finally delivered to Korea.
Normally, the traffic would take a shorter route, going between Canada, the US and directly to Korea. The traffic hijack lasted for six months, suggesting it was a deliberate attack, Demchak and Shavitt said.
Demchak and Shavitt detailed other traffic hijacks, including one that saw traffic from US locations to a large Anglo-American bank’s Milan headquarters being terminated in China, and never delivered to Italy, in 2016.
During 2017, traffic between Scandinavia and Japan, transiting the United States, was also captured by China Telecom, ditto data headed to a mail server operated by a large Thai financial company.
Interestingly, a 2015 Obama-Xi agreement aimed at stopping cyber IP theft by military forces appears to have been somewhat successful. But the agreement did not cover activities by Chinese corporations, and apparently nobody considered the security risks of allowing China Telecom to operate major internet nodes throughout North America. China does not allow US-based ISPs to control pieces of its internet infrastructure in China. Perhaps it’s time for the US and Canada to learn from China’s example.
From Axios, we learn that the Sino-American trade relationship will remain… strained… for a while:
President Trump has no intention of easing his tariffs on China, according to three sources with knowledge of his private conversations. Instead, these sources say he wants Chinese leaders to feel more pain from his tariffs — which he believes need more time to fully kick in.
What we’re hearing: “He wants them to suffer more” from tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods, said a source with direct knowledge of Trump’s thinking, and the president believes the longer his tariffs last, the more leverage he’ll have. […]
Behind the scenes: Trump has privately boasted that his China tariffs have driven down the country’s stock market. Experts say the trade war has hurt market sentiment, but the stock market has never been a reliable barometer of Chinese economic strength.
As 罗臻 points out:
A-shares are not a good measure of Chinese economic sentiment, it’s housing. In order to crack the housing market, however, Trump would need to inflict more pain for longer, to the point where China can’t contain the fallout and home prices start sinking 1 or 2 percent per month.
Trump is pursuing the right strategy for his intentions, even if he isn’t watching the right signals. Or maybe the stock market comments are for public (and China’s) consumption.
This is what happens when you build a metro line to a part of the city that hasn’t gone through the formality of existing yet:
Images of Caojiawan Station in Chongqing courtesy of Nick Smith (@smithni).
The new Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge in South China is without a doubt a spectacular feat of engineering, construction, and national infrastructure planning. But… is it necessary? Or is this mega-bridge snaking across the mouth of the Pearl River Delta in fact a $20 billion white elephant?
“The delays in the construction of the bridge had given cities in the PRD region time to greatly develop their port capacity, resulting in a situation where many exporters in the delta no longer need to use Hong Kong,” said chief research officer at the Hong Kong-based One Country Two Systems Research Institute, Fang Zhou. “Other PRD bridges will offer lower tariffs than the new bridge, while existing cargo barges to Hong Kong are even cheaper.”
“In terms of time and convenience, the bridge is not so competitive,” Zhou added. […]
The strongest economic benefit of the bridge is that it can enable producers west of the Pearl River move their goods faster to the Hong Kong International Airport. In 2016, the airport has handled around 4.52 million tons of air cargo, making it the top freight transportation airport worldwide for the seventh consecutive year.
Quoting an anonymous engineer:
“The bridge could have an impact on Hong Kongers’ life style when it opens – there could be more people making the decision to find a job, or even live in China when there are more convenient ways to connect the two places.”
That’s an important point, I think. In addition to the propaganda value of binding Hong Kong closer to the mainland, the very existence of the bridge may generate more demand for cross-border travel. It’s easy to underestimate the future traffic that a brand-new, colossal Chinese infrastructure project will generate. A lot of people were skeptical about China’s high-speed rail system back in 2011, but already by 2015 the Beijing-Shanghai line was earning a profit, claiming 130 million riders (one-tenth of China’s population) that year alone.
The blogger Big Lychee is characteristically scornful:
The vast link, with three lanes in each direction, will be the World’s Biggest and Longest Slab of Concrete Over Sea in the History of the Universe. It will also almost certainly be embarrassingly under-used. Of the three cities it connects, only Zhuhai and its hinterland has capacity for extra traffic; Macau’s road network is totally full, as is downtown Hong Kong’s. Apart from buses going back and forth, and presumably some trucks carrying containers full of Hello Kitty phone cases, it is hard to see who will use it, especially given the ‘fast and convenient’ permit system for car owners.
The South China Morning Post laboriously describes the thing as part of the Greater Bay Area Hub-Zone Branding Concept. [Ed: “Greater Bay Area” is China’s scheme to link together 11 cities around the Pearl River Delta into a gigantic metropolitan region with some 67 million people.] But it is actually the other way round – ‘Bay Area’ is an extension of the bridge project, which came first as a symbol if not means of integrating/absorbing Hong Kong into the Mainland.
This will be the second approx-HK$100 billion pointless-infrastructure fiasco inaugurated within a few weeks, following the West Kowloon High-Speed Rail Vibrating Express Line Hub (which at least has some potential use for those of us with an urgent desire to get to Wuhan). It also comes in the midst of the uproar about the Trillion-Dollar Sandpit Lantau Reclamation Wacko Proposal. We are surely hitting Peak Taxpayer-Wealth Destruction Orgy.
Meanwhile, in Asia, massive infrastructure projects continue to get built:
Chinese President Xi Jinping has officially opened the world’s longest sea crossing bridge, nine years after construction first began.
Including its access roads, the bridge spans 55km (34 miles) and connects Hong Kong to Macau and the mainland Chinese city of Zhuhai.
The bridge cost about $20bn (£15.3bn) and should have opened in 2016. […]
Designed to withstand earthquakes and typhoons, it was built using 400,000 tonnes of steel, enough to build 60 Eiffel Towers.
About 30km of its total length crosses the sea of the Pearl River delta. To allow ships through, a 6.7km section in the middle dips into an undersea tunnel that runs between two artificial islands.
The remaining sections are link roads, viaducts and land tunnels connecting Zhuhai and Hong Kong to the main bridge.
The bridge was first conceived by Hong Kong construction tycoon Gordon Wu in 1983, apparently inspired by the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel in Virginia. Construction started in 2009 and just wrapped up in February. Talk about persistence.
Special cameras will be on the look-out for drivers on the bridge who show signs of getting sleepy, among other checks – yawn three times and the authorities will be alerted, local media report. […]
And drivers will have to change which side of the road they are on at the crossing. People drive on the left in Hong Kong and Macau but the bridge is Chinese territory and special merger channels have been built to cope with this.
There’s also this ominous bit: “As drivers cross the bridge their heart rate and blood pressure will be monitored. The information will be sent to the bridge’s control centre.” What?
Video from the South China Morning Post:
A dire prediction, but is it correct?
The former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe warned Wednesday that it’s very likely the United States will be at war with China in 15 years.
Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges said that European allies will have to do more to ensure their own defenses in face of a resurgent Russia because America will need to focus more attention on defending its interests in the Pacific.
“The United States needs a very strong European pillar. I think in 15 years — it’s not inevitable — but it is a very strong likelihood that we will be at war with China,” Hodges told a packed room at the Warsaw Security Forum, a two-day gathering of leaders and military and political experts from central Europe.
“The United States does not have the capacity to do everything it has to do in Europe and in the Pacific to deal with the Chinese threat,” Hodges said.
I think it unlikely. What would they fight over? No doubt the Sino-American relationship is heating up, but China has no interest in war, and it’s hard to imagine the US going to war to defend the South China Sea or Taiwan. China will eventually replace the US as the dominant power in East Asia, and there’s not much the US can or will do about it.
In any case, the 2030s is almost certain to a very interesting decade all around. Buckle up.
The jury is still out, but this isn’t looking great for Bloomberg:
The veracity of a bombshell yarn claiming Chinese agents managed to sneak spy chips into Super Micro servers used by Amazon, Apple and the US government is still being fiercely argued over five days after publication. […]
Faced with such uncertainty, some are reaching for a unifying explanation: that Bloomberg was misled by some in the intelligence community that wish, for their own reasons, to raise the specter of Chinese interference in the global electronics supply chain. Bloomberg could be accurately reporting an intelligence misinformation campaign. […]
On the possible failure of adequate fact checking, earlier this week one of the security experts that Bloomberg spoke to in order to explain how the claimed spy chip would actually work, Joe Fitzpatrick, gave an interview to Aussie veteran infosec journalist Patrick Gray in which Fitzpatrick said he had told the Bloomberg spy-chip reporters of his doubts that it was feasible and that he was “uncomfortable” with the final article.
An NSA official is also pushing back:
Rob Joyce, Senior Advisor for Cybersecurity Strategy at the NSA, is the latest official to question the accuracy of Bloomberg Businessweek’s bombshell “The Big Hack” report about Chinese spies compromising the U.S. tech supply chain.
“I have pretty good understanding about what we’re worried about and what we’re working on from my position. I don’t see it,” said Joyce, speaking at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce cyber summit in Washington, D.C. today, according to a subscriber-only Politico report viewed by MacRumors.
“I’ve got all sorts of commercial industry freaking out and just losing their minds about this concern, and nobody’s found anything,” Joyce added.
Twitter user Hector Martin (@marcan42) had a fierce response to Bloomberg’s second story on the alleged Chinese hardware hacking:
Ah, I see, Bloomberg. So instead of a (partial) retraction of your at least half if not fully bullshit China implant story, you’re going to now publish *one guy’s* claim of Ethernet jack implants. When you had <5 days to check anything he provided.
Remember when a certain other security researcher was convinced his Ethernet jacks had implants? Remember all this “evidence”? How *we* knew it was BS? Now consider whether Bloomberg’s technically clueless journalists would know it’s BS.
Seriously, this is just pathetic now. They just went from “1 year and multiple sources” to “<5 days and one guy”. This is just negligence.
Why is it that every time something like this happens nobody has any hard documentation or analysis results? Ah yes, the best cop-out. “We don’t have it any more, we can’t give you more details”.
So now we have *software* detecting *analog* stuff like the “power consumption” of a *network*.
None of those words go together. At all.
Basically every Ethernet jack I’ve seen in anything but cheapo consumer routers/switches has been metal. How the hell is this an IOC?
Nevermind that… Ethernet jacks don’t have power pins. Where is this module (that uses so much power that it gets hot) magically powering itself from? Nobody runs PoE out to servers. Did they modify the board design to add power pins too?
Commenting on the above thread, Joe Fitzpatrick had this to say:
I was contacted and declined to give comment for this story. I explained this wasn’t the first time this year someone was making this claim.
@marcan42 has experience debunking claims of ‘backdoored’ ethernet jacks. Details in this story are almost identical to last time.
Sepio systems also shared a document with me yesterday. It had juicy details about rogue hardware.
It was a marketing 1-pager.
Whatever the truth of the matter, Yossi Appleboum, the ex-Israeli intelligence guy cited in Bloomberg’s follow-up story, gets the last word:
We found it in different vendors, not just Supermicro. We found it not just in servers, in different variations, but hardware manipulation on different interfaces, mostly in network related. We found it in different devices connected to the network, even Ethernet switches. I am talking about really big what are considered to be major American brands, many compromised through the same method.
This is why I think that Supermicro has nothing to do with that. In many cases, by the way, it is not through manufacturing, it is after through the supply chain.
People think of the supply chain in a very narrow sense between the manufacturer and the customer. Supply chain never ends. There are technicians, there are integrators, there are people that work in your facilities. We have seen after installation, after the fact attacks where someone switched something already installed. This is why Supermicro would have no idea what happens later in the supply chain. […]
We have a problem. The problem is the hardware supply chain. All of us are dealing with what happened to Supermicro, and whether Amazon knew or did not know. That is not the main issue for me. The main issue is that we have a problem. It is global. This is why I think Supermicro is suffering from the big players. I am talking about the really big players who know that they have the same problem, and they are kind of using the story right now to throw Supermicro under the bus instead of coming out and saying that it is a global problem, let’s fix it and find a solution.