Shut down Confucius Institutes in the US

Why I gave up my academic freedom

This really isn’t that hard:

I’d been invited to give a keynote speech and accept an award at Savannah State University’s Department of Journalism and Mass Communications. In a description of my background, I’d listed the self-governing island as one of the places where I’d reported. But in the printed materials for the event, the reference to Taiwan had been removed.

The department had given the award annually since 1975. But in the past few years, finances had dwindled and organizers struggled to find the resources to cover the expenses of bringing in a speaker from out of town.

Enter the Confucius Institute, a Chinese government-affiliated organization that teaches Chinese language and culture and sponsors educational exchanges, with more than 500 branches around the globe. The branch at Savannah State, founded four years ago, agreed to sponsor the speech.

On campuses across the United States, funding gaps are leaving departments with little choice but to turn to those groups with the deepest pockets — and China is keen to offer money, especially through its global network of Confucius Institutes. But when academic work touches on issues the Chinese Communist Party dislikes, things can get dicey.

Indeed. Confucius Institutes are controlled (de facto) by the Communist Party of China, as part of a lavishly funded global propaganda effort. And the rationale for hosting these things always seems to boil down to money:

Savannah State University does not have a well-funded Asian studies department, and as university administrators told me when I was there, its students and members of the surrounding community have few opportunities to travel abroad. The young man working at the front desk of my hotel in Savannah told me he was going to China this summer with a dance troupe, on a trip sponsored by the Confucius Institute. Without institute funding, the dancers would probably never see China.

And so, schools like Savannah State must walk a fine line. “Often the American co-director is interested in supporting academic freedom and trying to manage the Confucius Institute in a way that is constructive,” says Peterson. Each Confucius Institute has two co-directors, one American and one Chinese. But that’s “really hard to do. And in some cases, well near impossible.”

Australia is even more willing to compromise on this issue:

In the US, Republican Senator Marco Rubio has led the charge against Confucius Institutes. In February, he wrote to four universities in Florida, urging them to terminate their agreements with Hanban in Beijing. Texas A&M University closed its Confucius Institute in April following a bipartisan recommendation from two congressmen. […]

Australian universities are different from their American counterparts, not least because of our tertiary sector’s greater dependence on Chinese international students. Rubio’s approach should have no sway here.

Strange. The county’s Confucius Institutes are designed to teach Australians, not Chinese. The large number of Chinese international students on Australian campuses is hardly relevant in this context, unless of course the implication is that Australia should be careful not to hurt those students’ feelings. In other words: “Nice $22 billion international education sector you’ve got there. Be a shame if something, you know, happened to it.”

In my China Matters brief I outline seven policy recommendations for Australian universities. Above all, those that host a Confucius Institute need to consider more stringent safeguards. Transparency is important to combat propaganda and will help assuage public concerns about Confucius Institutes.

I heartily agree that transparency is important, but the emphasis on combating propaganda and helping assuage public concerns is odd here. The purpose of transparency is more about preventing abuses and violations by the organization in question.

But university autonomy must be maintained, and Australia must avoid the precedent set in the US. The decision whether to extend or terminate an agreement with Hanban is a university’s alone to make. To uphold academic freedom means to safeguard campuses from undue government influence – be it from the PRC, the US, or even the Australian Government.

But shielding universities from US or Australian government influence evidently means exposing them to Communist Party influence. There is no neutral ground here and no way to avoid choosing sides.

Australians need opportunities to learn Mandarin, and Confucius Institutes provide classes taught by trained native speakers. Successive governments have committed to improving Asian literacy among Australians. But they have not – and in the foreseeable future will not – commit the needed millions of dollars to alternative Mandarin education.

For the time being, Confucius Institutes are an imperfect solution to help fill that need.

In other words: money, money, money.

Here’s three more words for you:

Shut. It. Down.

Odds of the Apocalypse: 37%

Only somewhat more likely than your house getting flooded

A hydrologist walks us through the cold mathematics of revolution and chaos:

While we don’t have any good sources of data on how often zombies take over the world, we definitely have good sources of data on when the group of people on the piece of dirt we currently call the USA attempt to overthrow the ruling government. It’s happened twice since colonization. The first one, the American Revolution, succeeded. The second one, the Civil War, failed. But they are both qualifying events. Now we can do math. […]

Stepping through this, the average year for colony establishment is 1678, which is 340 years ago. Two qualifying events in 340 years is a 0.5882% annual chance of nationwide violent revolution against the ruling government. Do the same math as we did above with the floodplains, in precisely the same way, and we see a 37% chance that any American of average life expectancy will experience at least one nationwide violent revolution.

This is a bigger chance than your floodplain-bound home flooding during your mortgage. [I.e. 26%]

It’s noticeably bigger.

And here’s a factoid that should give you pause for thought:

Since the fall of Constantinople in 1453, there have been 465 sovereign nations which no longer exist, and that doesn’t even count colonies, secessionist states, or annexed countries. Even if we presume that half of these nation-state transitions were peaceful, which is probably a vast over-estimation, that’s still an average of one violent state transition every 2.43 years.

Maybe the Silicon Valley billionaires, Hollywood celebrities and politicians who are secretly building apocalypse bunkers have rational reasons for doing so and are not completely nuts.

A generous offer

Thailand elephants

America: what could have been

In which Abraham Lincoln declines a most generous offer from a country far, far away:

I appreciate most highly Your Majesty’s tender of good offices in forwarding to this Government a stock from which a supply of elephants might be raised on our own soil. This Government would not hesitate to avail itself of so generous an offer if the object were one which could be made practically useful in the present condition of the United States.

Our political jurisdiction, however, does not reach a latitude so low as to favor the multiplication of the elephant, and steam on land, as well as on water, has been our best and most efficient agent of transportation in internal commerce.

“America hand”

Wang Qishan fire brigade chief

Wang Qishan is known in China as the party’s “fire brigade chief”

Fascinating nuggets from a recent FT article about Wang Qishan’s appointment as vice president of the PRC, just five months after he “retired” as China’s anti-graft czar (and the country’s second most powerful official):

The Chinese Communist party’s most trusted crisis manager has returned to front-line politics just in time to face one of the biggest challenges of his long career — managing the fallout from what is likely to be the most dramatic deterioration in Sino-US relations in 30 years. […]

“Wang Qishan has forgotten more about our country than many of our senior people know,” said Steve Bannon, US President Donald Trump’s former political adviser who met Mr Wang in Beijing in September. “The level of detail he knew about the US was stunning — the economics of regions, the economics of cities, American infrastructure, the workings of the American economy.” […]

But with the recent departures of Mr Cohn and Mr Tillerson, there are very few senior Trump administration figures to argue for moderation in dealing with China. “Trump is going to be quite confrontational,” said Mr Bannon. “But the Chinese absolutely think the American establishment is going to bail them out and why wouldn’t they, it did in the past.

“The Chinese are going to play for time, engage in dialogue,” he added. “They owned us in Mar-a-Lago, no doubt about it. The globalists were in the ascendancy then, agreed to two ‘strategic’ dialogues [with China] and nothing got done, just more talk.”

I noted the FT piece about Wang’s meeting with Bannon here.

Buckle up

US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer

The tariffs cometh:

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said Wednesday the administration would likely be unveiling tariffs against China soon, but cautioned that the precise details are still subject to change.

“The president is going to make a decision in the very near future,” Lighthizer told the House Ways and Means Committee. “Our view is that we have a very serious problem of losing our intellectual property, which is really the single biggest advantage of the American economy. … We are losing that to China in ways that is not reflective of the underlying economics.” […]

He said that the existing world trade system, including the World Trade Organization, was “wholly inadequate” to deal with China because it is “state-dominated economy that rejects market principles.”

Better dig a bomb shelter and stock up on canned beans and shotguns shells, as we are reliably informed that tariffs will lead to a “trade war.”

Tariff talking points

Some thoughts from trade expert Alan Tonelson on the impending metals tariffs:

>Many countries have declared their intention to retaliate against the American tariffs with higher barriers to U.S. exports. Curiously, they are overlooking the Chinese government-subsidized overcapacity at the root of the long-time distortions in world steel and aluminum markets.

>Many of these countries want the problem tackled multilaterally. But the World Trade Organization (WTO) has failed to stem this overcapacity (or deal effectively with many other forms of Chinese trade and broader economic predation), and a G20 forum specifically addressing the steel issue has produced nothing since its founding in December, 2016.

>Although major steel-producing powers like the European Union have imposed their own steep tariffs on shipments from China, the global glut has continued. One reason may be that, since the global economic recovery took hold in 2010, according to World Steel Association data. the United States has been the major steel producer that has suffered by far the greatest loss of global production share by volume. (See this post of mine for the 2010 figures and the Steel Association’s latest report for the most recent – January, 2018 – figures.) And as of the most current World Steel Association data (2016), the United States is also the steel producer with the highest steel trade deficit by volume (21.7 million tons).

As a result, charges that American steel tariffs in particular will jeopardize the rules-based global trade system seem to be arguing that this system requires the United States to remain as the world’s dumping ground for government-subsidized steel.

Also don’t miss the follow-up post.

Who’s afraid of a trade war?

Can you be afraid of something that doesn’t exist?

Economist Ian Fletcher writes in the HuffPo:

Trade wars are mythical. They simply do not happen.

If you google “the trade war of,” you won’t find any historical examples. There was no Austro-Korean Trade War of 1638, Panamanian-Brazilian Trade War of 1953 or any others. History is devoid of them.

Please don’t respond with that old canard about the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 starting a trade war and causing the Great Depression. It doesn’t stand up, as actual economic historians from Milton Friedman on the right to Paul Krugman on the left have documented. See here, and here, and here.

The Depression’s cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. A wave of bank failures in 1930 spread the collapse around the country. Trade had nothing to do with it.

As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect. For a start, it only applied to about one-third of America’s trade: about 1.3 percent of GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent—not a large jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide absent tariff increases.

Now, there will be much sound and fury about the decision by the US to slap tariffs on steel and aluminum imports (of 25% and 10%, respectively). China, which accounts for 2% of US steel imports, will mostly shrug:

But most analysts said the move was more of an irritant to China than anything serious at this stage.

A glut of steel from China has fueled global oversupply, but Lu Zhengwei, chief economist at Industrial Bank in Shanghai, said China had already been working to cut overcapacity in its steel industry.

Anti-dumping duties imposed by the Obama administration on China two years ago had also helped cut U.S. imports from China and protect a restructured U.S. steel industry based around mini-mills, experts said. Last year, China’s steel exports fell 30 percent […]

The uproar over trade in nineteenth century commodities is drowning out the far more important issue for the US, which is the destruction of the American edge in advanced manufacturing thanks to trade and technology transfers:

America produced every important invention in the digital age, from integrated circuits to semiconductor lasers, solar cells, flat panel displays, sensors and light-emitting diodes. Except for integrate[d] circuits, Asia now produces virtually all the world’s output of these building-blocks of the electronics industry, and China has a crash program underway to become the world’s major producer of semiconductors.

The steel tariff could be just an opening salvo, as the US prepares to take action on high-tech manufacturing. That’s when the sparks would really fly. On the other hand, there are no clear signs that this will actually happen, so we’ll just have to wait and see.

Amtrak fail

What is going on with this?

The troubling string of Amtrak crashes

An Amtrak train en route to Miami from New York collided with a freight train early Sunday morning in South Carolina, killing two individuals and adding another tragic entry to the list of recent Amtrak derailments and crashes, per the AP.

The list, per the AP: […]

Summary: 12 accidents since 2011 (including last weekend’s), killing 23 and injuring hundreds.

There was much criticism of China’s lax safety standards and official opacity after a high-speed train collision in the city of Wenzhou killed 40 people in 2011. The fact that the US has suffered more than half that number of casualties in low-speed train accidents since 2011 should occasion a certain amount of concern.

A rearguard action

John Robb offers a proposal for an imploding United States to postpone China’s rise to absolute global dominance by throwing a wrench in China’s $8 trillion “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure project:

One solution is to mount a rearguard action — a method of delaying an advancing enemy when your forces are in retreat. An action that buys time for the US to regroup and regain cohesion. The US faced a similar situation re; the Soviet Union in ’79 after the invasion of Afghanistan. In that case, support for Afghan insurgents kept the Soviets occupied while the US recovered (Carter, inflation, Iran, etc.). In this case, the rearguard action would be the disruption of China’s plans for one belt one road. This could be done inexpensively and with very little manpower or visibility. How?

  • Create groups that operate like global guerrillas. Small groups that operate independently w/o oversight. More letters of marque than special operations.
  • In the short term, disrupt the Chinese construction effort. Double and treble construction costs by delaying timeliness and forcing increased security efforts. Drive up the costs of financing. Drive away subcontractors.
  • Next, force the Chinese to physically and logically protect the entire system, from roads to ports to trains, from disruption. As my analysis of Lawrence of Arabia shows, it’s more damaging to partially disrupt a system than to completely break it. Keep up the pressure — with the ability of systems disruption to generate a million to one return on investment, this is sustainable.

As Robb points out elsewhere: “Transportation (ports, roads, trains, etc.) is a natural monopoly. Nobody has tried to build one on a global scale until Xi.”

China's One Belt One Road

The US may conclude that it has no choice but to play the spoiler to China’s grand, shining vision of a sprawling infrastructure network linking 60 countries together under the benevolent aegis of the CPC. To get an idea of how this might work, consider that insurgent groups were able to successfully bleed the US of >$200,000,000,000 in failed efforts to reconstruct Iraq.

As for “the ability of systems disruption to generate a million to one return on investment,” consider a classic example from Robb: A small insurgent attack on an oil pipeline in southeast Iraq, which cost roughly $2,000 to execute, inflicted $500 million of damage on the Iraqi government in lost oil exports (an ROI of 25 million percent).

Doesn’t the US risk more from disruption than China? No. The US doesn’t have a choice. If it doesn’t act while this system is being built (when it is the most vulnerable to disruption), the US will cede global dominance to China forever. China is creating the equivalent of “Standard Oil stranglehold” on the global economy and once established it will likely become too big/too entrenched to roll back through global guerrillas.