Will Canada go east?

This essay by strategist Edward Luttwak (a.k.a. the Machiavelli of Maryland), on why Canada should turn its military attention to the Pacific, also serves as a mini recap of the theme of Luttwak’s book The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy:

It would appear that China’s leaders badly misread the 2007-2008 financial crisis and greatly overestimated China’s gain in relative strategic power. This prompted them to abandon the very successful “peaceful rise” (中国和平崛起) or “peaceful development” (中国和平 发展) foreign policy officially presented in 2004, but long practised before then. This policy set aside all Chinese claims against regional parties in order to have everyone’s co-operation in China’s economic growth.

Once that policy was abandoned, there ensued the loud and practically simultaneous assertion of Chinese territorial claims against Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, and India, in a half-circle of expansionist pretensions. Newly aggressive forms of border and maritime patrolling, increasingly frequent territorial intrusions, and even outright occupations added greatly to the concerns provoked by China’s verbal demands.

Inevitably, the threatened countries started to strengthen themselves militarily and to coalesce diplomatically. They did this mostly in pairs that became increasingly interconnected, but also in threes, as in the case of the India-Japan-Vietnam trio that accelerated Vietnam’s deployment of Russian submarines. […]

Nobody can reasonably suggest that Canada should restructure its armed forces on a very large scale in order to become a major power in Northeast Asia. But given that Canadian political and economic leaders know very well that the centre of gravity in world politics has changed, it would behoove Canada to gradually acquire a significant stabilizing role, in the agreeable company of Australia.

The essay also contains this nugget of strategic wisdom:

All of this is in perfect accordance with the paradoxical logic of strategy which prohibits any form of linear progression in the realm of conflict. This logic ordains that great powers can defeat middle powers, but not small ones.

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